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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16522 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with two felonies--Possession 
of a Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of § 41-1-112, Utah 
Code Ann., (1953, as amended), and Theft in violation of 
§ 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended), to which he 
pleaded not guilty (R. 10). He was later charged with the 
Class A misdemeanor offense of Attempted Possession of a 
Stolen Motor Vehicle, to which appellant pleaded guilty 
(R._ 8, :?1). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was sentenced by Judge David B. Dee 
on May 23, 1979, in the Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to a term of 11 months, 
such term "to run consecutively with the present sentence 
and concurrently with the sentence of Judge Gowans" (R. 28), 
who had so sentenced appellant on May 2, 1979 for Failure 
to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, also a Class A 
misdemeanor (R. 38 and Appellant's Brief at p. 1). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respo~dent seeks affirmation of the judgments and 
sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Inasmuch as this appeal is limited to a review of 
a court's consecutive sentencing power, and inasmuch as 
appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged in the 
information, no transcript was made of the proceedings and 
thus this sketchy statement of facts is derived solely 
from the trial court's record. 
On January 28, 1979, a motor vehicle was stolen 
from the Budget Rent-A-Car parking lot. On or about Februa0 
1, 1979, appellant was observed driving a 1979 Mercury 
automobile, serial number 9Z6~F618790, in an unlawful manner 
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and committed a traffic violation (R. 5, 7). salt Lake 
county Sheriff deputies pursued the appellant and a 
collision resulted at 950 East North Union Boulevard 
(R. 5, 7). A search of Budge Rent-A-Car's records revealed 
that the car stolen from its lot on January 28 was the car in 
appellant's possession on February 1, 1979. 
Appellant was originally charged with two felonies--
Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann., § 41-1-112 (1953, as amended), a third-degree 
felony, and Theft, in violation of § 76-6-404, Utah Code 
Ann., (1953, as amended), a second-degree felony (R. 5, 7), 
to both of which appellant pleaded not guilty (R. 10). 
After a sequence of "plea bargaining" meetings, 
the State agreed to reduce the charges to a single offense 
of Attempted Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, which 
reduced the third-degree offense to a Class A misdemeanor 
(see § 76-4-102 (4), Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended)). 
On May 23, 1979, the appellant entered his written 
and signed guilty plea to Judge David B. Dee and was sentenced 
"consecutively with the present sentence and concurrently 
with the sentence of Judge Gowans" (R. 28). Appellant's 
present sentence was an undescribed felony conviction which 
-3-
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appellant was serving for ten years (December 1, 1969 
to November 30, 1979) (R. 38). The "sentence of Judge 
Gowans" was a sentence received on May 2, 1979, also for a 
Class A misdemeanor offense of Failure to Respond to an 
Signal to Stop (R. 38 and Appellant's Brief, p. 1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-3-401 GIVES 
A COURT AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE A 
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ADJUDGED GUILTY 
OF TWO OR MORE OFFENSES. 
Appellant's contention in his first point is that 
a strict reading of Utah Code Ann., § 76-3-401 (1) (1953 1 as 
amended) , forbids the imposition of consecutive sentences 
where both offenses are not felonies. While true, the 
subsection does state that ". . . a court shall determine 1 if 
a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
a fuller reading of the statute reveals that a court may 
consider other circumstances of the offenses in deciding 
whether to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence. 
A complete reading of§ 76-3-401(1) reveals: 
Subject to the limitations of 
subections (2) through (5) I a court 
shall determine, lf a defendant has 
been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose 
-4-
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concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences shall 
run concurrently unless the court 
states, in the sentence, that they 
shall run consecutively. 
Emphasis added. 
Thus, this subsection must be read in conjunction 
with subsections (2) through (5) and hence, all phrases of 
subsection (1) must be tempered with the full thrust of these 
other four subsections. 
Subsection 76-3-401(2) is most dispositive of this 
appeal. It reads: 
A court shall consider the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
In the present case, appellant's criminal history 
and character and the circumstances of the present offense(s) 
all weigh heavily against him and support the court's 
ruling. It is particularly noteworthy that appellant was 
originally charged with two felonies--Possession of a Stolen 
Motor Vehicle in violation of§ 41-1-112, Utah Code Ann., 
(1953, as amended), a third degree felony, and Theft by 
Receiving in violation of§ 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann., 
(1953, as amended), a second degree felony (R. 5, 7). As 
noted in the Statement of Facts, supra, a plea bargain 
process resulted in appellant pleading guilty to the class 
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A misdemeanor nffense of Attempted Possession of a Stolen 
I1otor Vehicle (R. 8 and 21) . Thus, this sequence of 
defense maneuvers weighed heavily against appellant inasmuch 
as § 76-3-401(2) allows a court to consider such extrinsic 
factors in determining how a defendant is to be sentenced 
(See Statement of Facts, supra). 
Appellant also construes subsection (4) of 
§ 76-3-401 to imply that "some courts are not 'lawfully 
determined' to impose a consecutive sentence." Respondent 
submits that this interpretation is inaccurate. Subsection 
(4) reads: 
If a court lawfully determined to 
impose consecutive sentences, the 
aggregate minimum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed twelve years' 
imprisonment and the aggregate maximum 
of all sentences imposed may not exceed 
thirty years' imprisonment. However, 
this limitation does not apply if an 
offense for which defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or life 
imprisonment. 
The intent of this subsection is that where a court has 
decided, in its best view of the facts and legal issues of 
the case, that a consecutive sentence is appropriate, then 
the limitations above quoted in subsection (4) apply. 
Appellant asks this Court to make a strained reading of 
the subsection by suggesting that some courts are authorized 
to impose consecutive sentences and others are not. This 
view is without merit. 
-6-
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The recent case of State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 
(Utah, 1978), gives support to respondent's position. In 
Beck, appellant argued that the court erred in imposing 
consecutive sentences by not properly following the re-
quirements of§ 76-3-401{2). This Court answered that claim 
by ruling: 
Beck relies on Title 76-3-401{2) 
of the Code to urge that the court in a 
consecutive sentence situation is duty 
bound to "consider the gravity and cir-
cumstances of the offenses." The Court 
complied, orderinq a diaonostic report 
before sentence, and although it is not 
in the record, Beck did not show that 
it did not indicate other than that it 
led the court to consider the gravity 
of the offenses and it must, therefore 
be presumed that the court did what the 
statute proscribed [sic]. This, 
strengthened with the substantive rule 
of discretion on the part of the court 
to determine concurrent or consecutive 
sentencing, dispels any claim of error 
by defendant. 
584 P.2d at 872. 
Much the same circumstances are present in the 
instant case. Although the record here is also silent as 
to whether the court did indeed consider the facts, history 
and circumstances of the offense as required by§ 76-3-401(7.), 
this Court may presume (as was done in Beck), that such 
consideration was made. Thus, respondent urges this Court 
to again rule as was done in Beck, that the lower court here 
may , in its discretion, impose a consecutive sentence on 
-7-
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POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-14, ~rniCH 
ALLOWS A COURT TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES UPON A DEFENDANT BEFORE 
JUDGMENT ON EITHER, DOES NOT RESTRICT 
A COURT FROH Il1POSING A CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCE I-THERE TWO OFFENSES WERE 
COMMITTED TEN YEARS APART. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-14 (1953), as amended, must be read so as to limit 
a court's ability to impose consecutive sentences for 
multiple offenses only where neither offense's judgment 
has been rendered. The statute reads: 
If the defendant has been convicted 
of two or more offenses, before judgment 
on either, the judgment may be that the 
imprisonment upon any one may commence 
at the expiration of the imprisonment upon 
any other of the offenses. 
Respondent submits that the intent of this 
statute was not to restrict the discretionary power of 
courts by requiring that consecutive sentences may only 
be given "before judgment on either." The statute is still 
colored with discretionary language (i.e., "the judgment 
may be. " and "ir.tpr i sonmen t . . . may commence") which 
supports respondent's contention that judicial discretion 
in· sentencing in this statute remains intact and unaffected. 
Another consideration is the fact that under 
-8-
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the general legal and statutory principle of in pari materia, 
similar statutes must be read together for the aggregate, 
cumulative effect of each to be realized. Thus, reading 
Section 76-3-401 and 77-35-14 in pari materia, the only 
conclusion is that the lower court acted properly in 
ruling that appellant be sentenced consecutively with the 
offense he was presently serving. 
The case of State v. Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 
781 (1967), is supportive of this position. There, this 
Court was faced with a claim that the doctrine of concurrent 
and/or consecutive sentences had been wrongly applied. 
Appellant, sentenced under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953), 
as an "habitual criminal" with the potential of serving a 
life sentence, \vas given a consecutive sentence after he was 
later found guilty of first degree perjury. In construing 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-14 (1953), as amended (the same 
statute at issue here), this Court ruled that "(t]his section 
gives the court the right to make the sentences run consecu-
tively instead of concurrently." 425 P.2d at 783. 
It is important that in Dodge, the appellant, just 
as the appellant in the instant matter, was incarcerated 
in the Utah State Prison on a previous conviction when he 
was sentenced to a consecutive sentence for a later offense. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Yet, this court specifically ruled that § 77-35-14 
was no bar to a trial court's determination that a 
defendant may properly be given a consecutive sentence 
after a previous sentence has been pronounced. 
Finally, it is respondent's view that common 
sense, public policy considerations of this case show that 
Judge Dee's sentencing decision was proper. The strong fact 
against appellant in this case, his past criminal 
history, the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the appellant's character and rehabilitative possi-
bilities all support the imposed consecutive sentence. 
Respondent submits that, under all these considered 
circumstances, appellant's consecutive sentence is 
appropriate and commensurate with the offense(s) 
committed. In fact, the imposition of a concurrent 
sentence here woulu not have been in the best interests 
of the State of Utah since appellant would have only 
been required to serve six months (May 23, 1979 to 
November 30, 1979) as opposed to eleven months for 
the Class A misdemeanor offense, to which appellant 
pleaded guilty. 
The lower court's ruling also preserves the 
discretionary power of the judiciary in this area of 
-10-
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defendant sentencing. Respondent, therefore, urges this 
court to reject appellant's second argument, as well, as being 
without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-401 and 77-35-14 (1953, 
as amended), provide courts with the power to sentence 
a defendant convicted of multiple offenses to concurrent 
or consecutive sentences. This power is evident from 
the statutes, per se, and further supported by Utah case 
law. Respondent suggests that a careful review by this 
Court of the facts of this case"and the statutes and case 
law authorities will result in the unavoidable conclusion 
that appellant was properly sentenced by Judge Dee. 
Respondent asserts that this ruling of the 
lower court was proper and prays the verdict and sentence 
be affimed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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